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COPYRIGHT MISUSE ... GETTING
DEFENSIVE: LASERCOMB AMERICA,
INC. v. REYNOLDS
The United States Constitution confers upon Congress the
power to establish copyright and patent law.' The purpose of this
constitutional grant is to promote the general welfare through the
advancement of "Science and useful Arts" by rewarding inventors
and authors with an exclusive right to their original works.' Con-
' See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries...
Id.
2 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (patent grant
excludes others from profiting from patented invention); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 555 (1973) (Article 1, section 8, clause 8, of Constitution encourages "people to
devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation... [by guaranteeing] to authors and
inventors a reward in the form of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their
works"); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (patent grant
is "special privilege 'to Promote progress of Science and useful Arts,'" and "[ilt carries, of
course, a right to be free from competition in the practice of the invention"). Though
authors and inventors benefit from the grant of copyrights and patents, the benefit the
public receives, through the advancement of 'Science and useful Arts,' is paramount. See
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). "[E]ncouragement of individual effort by per-
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" Id. (emphasis added). See United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (copyright law, like patent law, makes re-
warding owner secondary to public benefit); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (interest in patent monopolies being
free from fraud or inequitable conduct is paramount public interest); Marconi Wireless Co.
v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 58 (1942) (if invalid in part, rule patent invalid in its entirety
for public protection); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("primary object
in conferring the monopoly lies [sic] in the general benefits derived by the public"); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1917) (public interest is
dominant); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.) (copyright holder's
interest is subordinate to greater public good), art, denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Caldwell
v. Kirk Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir.) ("The public is a silent but an important
party in interest in all patent litigation." (quoting Long v. Arkansas Foundry Co., 247 F.2d
366, 369 (8th Cir. 1957))), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); Greening Nursery Co. v.J & R
Tool & Mfg. Co., 252 F. Supp. 117, 139-40 (S.D. Iowa 1966) ("interest of the public is
paramount"), affd, 376 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1967). See also Wallace, Proper Use of the Patent
Misuse Doctrine - An Antitrust Defense to Patent Infringement Actions In Need of Rational Re-
form, 26 MERcER L. Rgv. 813, 813 (1975) (patent and copyright system were "created to
serve the laudable constitutional objectives of advancing the public well-being"); W.C.
HoLMrs, INTELLECIAL PRoPERTY AND ANnrTusT LAw § 1.01, at 1-2 (1990) (states object of
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gress has exercised this power by enacting the Copyright and Pat-
ent Acts.3 In recognition of the goal of patent legislation, the
United States Supreme Court provided the public with a patent
misuse defense to infringement claims brought by patent owners
who have extended their statutory rights into unsanctioned areas."
constitution in granting legislative power).
a See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). "Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee .. . for the
term of seventeen years,. .. the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
111VC1IL1UL3 LihIUUi& iJi Ih. i ...
[T]he owner of a copyright... has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of
the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2)
to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute cop-
ies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dra-
matic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audio-
visual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and (5) in the case of liter-
ary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). "Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists
from its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and fifty
years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1977).
Federal courts have clearly recognized these intellectual property rights. See Dawson
Chemical, 448 U.S. at 179-80 (patentee able to obtain relief against infringers); Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (patent is statutory grant of monopoly);
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (patent grants to patentee
exclusive right to make, use and vend particular device); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool
Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.) (patent grant excludes others from using patentee's
discovery without consent), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983); Granite Music Corp. v.
United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1976) (copyright is absolute right to
prevent others from copying work); Scarlati v. Brenner, 260 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D.D.C.
1966) (patent is grant of monopoly); Austin v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 776, 779 (N.D. Ill.
1962) (copyright provides exclusive right to publish, copy, vend compositions); Greenbie v.
Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (copyright monopoly gives owner exclusive
right to "exploit the form of his expression"). See generally HoLMEs, supra note 2, § 1.02, at
1-2, § 4.07, at 4-10 to 4-13 (1990) (rights of holder of copyright grant).
4 See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493 (misuse defense founded in public interest in free
competition). The majority of cases have followed Morton Salt and have found the use of a
patent to acquire a monopoly which is outside the terms of the patent to constitute misuse.
See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343-44
(1971) (Court condemned attempts to broaden scope of patent monopoly); Sears, Roebuck,
376 U.S. at 229-31 (patent may not be used to secure limited monopoly of unpatented
device); Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 664-65 (patent misuse results in licensing provisions that sup-
press competition outside patent rights); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 497-98
(1942) (companion case to Morton Salt; patentee who authorizes manufacturer to use pat-
ented item only with materials furnished by him cannot enjoin infringement); W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1976) ("attempt to extend the
patent monopoly beyond the patent claims or the limited period of the monopoly grant
necessarily runs counter to the patent laws"); Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd.,
450 F. Supp. 817, 822 (D.D.C. 1978) (party raising misuse defense need not show harm to
self since "concern here [is] the adverse effects on the public interest"); Valmont Indus.,
182
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While the Constitution treats patents and copyrights in tandem,
no analogous copyright misuse defense has been codified by the
legislature or expressly approved by the Supreme Court.' Al-
Inc. v. Yuma Mfg. Co., 296 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D. Col. 1969) (patentee may not use
patent to control sale or use of unpatented articles); General Elec. Co. v. Hygrade Sylvania
Corp., 45 F. Supp 714, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (if patentee alleged infringer has used patent
for illegal purposes or purposes contrary to public policy, court justified in denying relict);
U.M.A. Inc. v. Burdick Equip. Co., 45 F. Supp. 755, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (cannot maintain
infringement suit where conduct in exploitation of patent violates public policy).
"According to this [patent misuse] doctrine, a court may, as a matter of equitable discre-
tion, refuse to enjoin infringement of a patent as long as the patent is being 'misused' to
violate the antitrust laws or to otherwise act contrary to the public interest." HoLtm, supra
note 2, § 1.07, at 1-2. See Brinson, Patent Misuse; Time for a Change, 16 RuTGRs Comp'. &
Tirat L.J. 357-58 (1990) (under misuse doctrine, infringer can avoid liability for infringe-
ment). Patent misuse has been recognized where patent owners engage in tying agree-
ments, price fixing and prohibiting the production or sale of competing goods. See United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 571, 380 (1952). See also Motion Picture Patents, 243
U.S. at 517-18 (patentee cannot condition sale of patented item on buyer's agreement to
purchase another); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 257
(3d Cir. 1943) (misuse for patentee to restrict manufacturing of patented washers to manu-
facturers who agree to refrain from manufacturing competing washers not covered by its
patent).
The misuse defense has likewise been recognized in trademark law. See Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 560 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1977) (enforce-
ment of trademark denied to one who used it to violate antitrust-laws), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1070 (1978); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Veb Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 706 (2d Cir.
1970) (acknowledged antitrust-based misuse of trademark defense), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
905 (1971); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n., Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.
360 F. Supp. 459, 465 (N.D. Tx. 1973) (defense to trademark infringement that defendant
used mark in scheme to violate antitrust law), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). See infra notes 31-45 and ac-
companying text (discussion of Morten Salt and 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, 35 U.S.C.§ 27 1(dX4), (5), which limited Morton Salt's holding).
6 See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990) ("No United
States Supreme Court decision has firmly established a copyright misuse defense."); Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Serv., 746 F. Supp. 320, 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (declining to create copyright misuse claim given lack of precedent); Bell-
south Advertising & Publishing Co. v. Donnelly Information Publishers, Inc., 719 F. Supp.
1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (Supreme Court "has not expressly held that a court of equity
ought to decline to enjoin infringement where the copyright owner [misuses a copyright]"
(quoting Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y.
1979))). See generally Houma, supra note 2, § 4.09, at 4-18 (Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly recognized copyright misuse defense).
The United States Supreme Court has, however, implied the existence of the copyright
misuse defense. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U. S. 1,
6 (1978) (while court of appeals found copyright misuse to exist, Supreme Court remanded
because it disagreed with court of appeals' finding of per se illegality in blanket license);
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962) (implied principles underlying patent
misuse are applicable to copyright). See generally M.B. Nnnu.. 3 Nrntms ON Copyazosr §
13.09(A), at 13-144 (1990) (Supreme Court hints towards validity of copyright misuse de-
fense in United States v. Loew's, Inc.).
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though reference has been made to the implied existence of a
copyright misuse defense in the lower federal courts, its validity
has not been upheld with any definitiveness or uniformity. In re-
sponse to the ambiguity, the United States Court of Appeals for
6 See United States Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir.
1988) (declined to hold specifically that copyright misuse defense exists, but proceeded as-
suming that it did, and rejected its application); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fer-
nando Valley Bd., 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (alleged conduct did not constitute
;.r c,- -t,,FW. I. ,,hlietinn%.. Ltd. v. Catholic Bishoo of Chicauo. 214 U.S.P.Q.
409, 413-16 (7th Cir.) (misuse of copyright in violation of antitrust laws may be asserted as
defense), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Blendingwell Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 612
F. Supp 474, 483-84 (D.C. Del. 1985) (in absence of violation of antitrust law, no basis for
allegation of copyright misuse); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758,
772-73 (D.C. Del. 1981) (without sanctioning validity of copyright misuse claim, court pro-
ceeded to analyze claim that defendant unlawfully extended scope of its copyrights), afd,
691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982).
Other courts in dicta have presented affirmative arguments supporting the existence of
the copyright misuse doctrine. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc.,
816 F.2d 1191, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1987) (drew analogy between patent misuse and copy.
right misuse); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("In an appropriate case a misuse of the copyright statute that in some way
subverts the purpose of the statute . . . might constitute a bar to judicial relief."), cert.
denied sub noa. Bora v. Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Tempo Music,
Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 1969) (defense of unclean hands by virtue of
copyright misuse is permissible); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertain-
ment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y 1990) (found copyright misuse defense to be
cognizable but declined to create claim); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Co. v. Donnel-
Icy Information Publishing, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (antitrust de-
fense can bar enforcement of infringement claim if copyright holder attempts to extend
power granted by copyright).
Quite to the contrary, several courts have denied existence of such a defense and refused
to analyze its validity. See Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 746 F.
Supp. 520, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (court determined classic and ancient equitable doctrine of
unclean hands is inapplicable); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, 663 F. Supp. 214,
220 (D. Kan. 1987) (violation of antitrust laws not valid defense in copyright infringement
action), affd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.), cert. granted in part, Ill S. Ct. 40 (1990); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1152, 1160-61 (N.D. 11. 1981) (antitrust viola-
tion no defense to copyright infringement); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474
F. Supp 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denied existence of copyright misuse defense); Peter
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (misuse of
copyright not proper defense to action for copyright infringement); Harms, Inc. v. Samson
House Enters., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (defense of violation of anti-
trust laws not permitted in copyright infringement action), aff d sub norn. Leo Feist, Inc. v.
Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959). In denying the existence of the
defense, courts generally have reasoned that the fact that one had misused his copyright
does not "authorize others to injure him with impunity." Vitagraph, Inc. v. Grogaski, 46
F.2d 813, 814 (W.D. Mich. 1931). See generally Comment, Copyright Misuee and Cable Telei-
sion; Orth-o-uision, Inc. v. Home Box Offw, 35 FEn. Comm. .J. 347, 354 (1983) (federal courts
disagree on copyright misuse validity); Ninesca, supra note 5, § 13.09(A), at 13-142 to 13-
144 (1990) (discussion of validity of copyright misuse defense through violation of copy-
right laws).
184
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the Fourth Circuit, in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,7 made
the first decisive statement addressing the issue, holding that a
copyright misuse defense is available in infringement actions
brought by copyright owners.'
In Lasercomb, the respondents, Lasercomb America, Inc.
("Lasercomb"), developed a software program, "Interact," which
enabled a programmer to design a steel rule die.9 Prior to market-
ing the program, Lasercomb entered into an agreement with Hol-
iday Steel Rule Die Corporation ("Holiday Steel") whereby Holi-
day Steel would purchase and use four copies of the "Interact"
program.1" Subsequent to receipt of the program, appellant Larry
Holliday, president and sole shareholder of Holiday Steel, di-
rected his computer programmer, appellant Job Reynolds, to
make three unauthorized copies of "Interact."'" Under Holliday's
further direction, Reynolds created a steel rule die program which
was almost an exact copy of "Interact," to be marketed as a Holi-
day Steel product. 2 Upon discovering the actions of appellants,
Lasercomb registered its copyright in "Interact' 3 3 and filed an ac-
tion against Holliday, Reynolds and Holiday Steel claiming, pri-
marily, copyright infringement and fraud." The appellants as-
serted several counterclaims 5 and raised the affirmative defense
7 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
' Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1990). "IS]ince copy-
right and patent law serve parallel public interests, a "misuse" defense should apply to
infringement actions brought to vindicate either right." Id. at 976.
9 Id. at 971. A steel rule die is a manufacturing tool which is "used to cut and score
paper and cardboard for folding into boxes and cartons." Id.
10 Id. By way of this agreement, Holiday Steel paid $35,000 for the first copy of "Inter-
act," $17,500 each for the second and third copies and $2,000 for the fourth copy. Id. Any
additional copies Holiday Steel cared to purchase would cost $2,000 each. Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
Is Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990). Lasercomb ac-
quired its copyright in "Interact" before it entered into the licensing agreement with Holi-
day Steel, but failed to register it with the Federal Copyright Office until 1986. Id. Al-
though registration of a copyright is not mandatory, it is a statutory prerequisite to
instituting an infringement action. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (1977). Furthermore, a registra-
tion certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the
facts stated therein, when such registration occurs before or within five years after the first
publication of the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1977).
14 Lasrcomb, 911 F.2d at 972. In addition, Lasercomb claimed breach of contract, mis-
appropriation of trade secret, false designation of origin and unfair competition. Id. The
latter three claims were dismissed as being preempted by the Copyright Act. Id.
1s Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Holiday Steel Rule Die Corp., 656 F. Supp. 612, 613
185
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of copyright misuse." They alleged that Lasercomb wrongfully
extended the rights granted by its copyright by incorporating a
clause into its standard licensing agreement prohibiting the licen-
see from writing, producing or selling computer die-making
software for a period of 99 years. 17 Although appellants did not
actually sign such an agreement and therefore were not bound by
the restrictions contained therein, Lasercomb was able to prove at
trial that at least one licensee was so bound.18
Ultimately, all of the counterclaims were dismissed.1 ' The
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Car-
olina rejected the affirmative defenses and held for Lasercomb,
awarding actual and punitive damages for infringement of copy-
right and fraud." Rejecting the copyright misuse defense, the dis-
trict court found the restrictive clause reasonable in light of the
subject matter." More significantly, the court questioned the very
(M.D.N.C. 198l7), affd in part, rev'd on other grounds sub no. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reyn-
olds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). In addition to the affirmative defense of misuse of
copyright, appellants asserted several counterclaims, including breach of contract, injurious
falsehood and trade defamation, unfair competition by competition disparagement, mali-
cious institution of a civil action, and unfair deceptive trade practices. Id.
1" See 3 P. RosamB=G, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 16.05121, at 16-76 (2d ed. 1990).
Misuse is not an affirmative cause of action but rather an affirmative defense to an infringe-
ment claim which must be pleaded and proven under Rule 8(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id.
1, Lasercmnb, 911 F.2d at 973. The restrictive clauses contained in the licensing agree-
ment read:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not permit or
suffer its directors, officers, and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop,
produce or sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after the
termination of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or
assist others in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die
making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent.
Any such activity undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any
warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth herein.
The "term of this Agreement" referred to in these clauses is ninety-nine years.
Id.
18 Id. at 973.
19 Id. at 972.
" Id. Lasercomb was awarded actual damages of $105,000 for copyright infringement
and fraud, of which Holliday, Reynolds and Holiday Steel were jointly and severally liable.
Id. Under the fraud claim, Lasercomb received $15,000 in punitive damages, $10,000
from Holliday and $5,000 from Reynolds. Id. All defendants were permanently enjoined
from publishing or making the software copied from Lasercomb's "Interact" program. Id.
"' Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Holiday Steel Rule Die Corp., 656 F. Supp. 612, 616
(M.D.N.C. 1987), af'd in part, rev'd on other grounds sub nomn. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reyn-
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds
existence of a copyright misuse defense."
On appeal, Holliday and Reynolds,' while admitting that they
copied the "Interact" program, argued that the court erred in re-
jecting the copyright misuse defense and claimed that Lasercomb
should have been denied recovery on that ground." The Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the infringement
claim, holding that the copyright misuse defense did indeed exist
and that all the required elements were satisfied by the appel-
lants."8 Accordingly, Lasercomb was barred from suing for in-
fringement of its copyright."
Writing for the majority, Judge Sprouse began by recognizing
that the patent misuse defense is well established and inherent in
patent law.' 7 Justifying the application of the misuse doctrine to
olds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). The district court reasoned that because Lasercomb did
not use the restrictive licensing agreement when dealing with Holiday Steel, the required
nexus between the claim and the defense did not exist. Id.
0 Id. The court noted that the defendants' assertion of copyright misuse failed to create
a genuine issue of fact. Id.
" See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 971 (4th Cir. 1990). As a result
of Holiday Steel's bankruptcy it was not a party to the appeal. Id. at 971 n. 1.
Id. at 972. Appellants also argued that the court erred in its finding of fraud and in
the calculation of damages. Id.
- Id. at 978-79. The court of appeals found Lasercomb misused its copyright by utiliz-
ing its licensing agreement to suppress any licensee from independently implementing the
idea which "Interact" expressed in a manner contrary to the public policy embodied in
copyright law. Id. In addition, the court affirmed the district court's finding of fraud and
remanded for a redetermination of damages. Id. at 980-81.
Id. at 979. A finding of misuse does not invalidate a copyright but rather precludes
the copyright holder from bringing an infringement action until the misuse ceases. Id. at
979 n.22. See United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457. 465 (1953)
(owner who misuses patent cannot recover from infringement until effect of misuse has
been dissipated or "purged"); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493
(1942) (equity can refuse to entertain infringement suit until improper practice is aban-
doned); Kearney & Trucker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 371-72 (6th
Cir. 1977) (misused patent may not be enforced until owner can show it has discontinued
illegal practice); Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 278-79 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 846 (1964) (relief was denied until misuser could show improper
practice was "fully abandoned" and its "consequences had been fully dissipated"); Reinke
Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 1056, 1068 (D. Neb. 1978) (where misuse is
"purged" owners right to enforce patent revives), af'd. 594 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1979);
HoLMEs, supra note 2, § 4.09, at 4-18 (copyright misuse defense holds enforcement of copy-
right against infringer can be denied if copyright is exploited to violate antitrust laws); 3 P.
RosmNEG., supra note 16, § 16.0212], at 16-40 (patent validity denied temporarily for
misuse).
" Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990). The court
found its primary authority for declaring the validity of the patent misuse defense in the
United States Supreme Court case of Morton Salt, Co. v. G.S. Suppfer Co., 314 U.S. 488
187
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copyright infringement claims, Judge Sprouse paralleled the ori-
gin and public policy behind the grant of both copyrights and pat-
ents and found them to be essentially the same.28 By way of anal-
ogy, Judge Sprouse concluded that the copyright misuse defense is
likewise inherent in copyright law and deserving of similar
treatment.2
It is submitted that in so far as Lasercomb established that the
copyright misuse defense follows a priori from its predecessor in
patent law, it did so correctly. However, Lasercomb's holding did
little more than promulgate broader application of an already
amorphous defense. This Comment will profile the analogous pat-
ent misuse defense and identify the infirmity of the misuse doc-
trine as it is applied to both patent and copyright law. Addition-
ally, an alternative standard of review will be offered which will
(1942). Id. at 975. In Morton Salt, the plaintiff owned a patent in salt-depositing machines
and by way of a licensing agreement required all licensees to purchase salt tablets from
them exclusively. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490. The Court concluded that the plaintiff mis-
used its patent by restraining competition in the salt tablet market and was thus disqualified
from maintaining an infringement action. Id. at 491, 494.
The Lasercomb court offered further evidence of the validity of the patent misuse defense
by noting Congress' acknowledgement of the doctrine in the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform
Act (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (dX4),(5)). Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. See infra notes 42-
45 and accompanying text for discussion of the Act (Patent Misuse Reform Act limited
holding in Morton Salt).
n Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
" Id. at 973, 976. The Lasercomb court traced the origin of patents and copyrights back
to 16th century England, where the English Crown commonly "gave individuals exclusive
rights to produce, import and/or sell given items within the kingdom." Id. at 974. Wide-
spread abuse of the granted rights resulted in shortages and inflated prices forcing Parlia-
ment to prohibit the creation of such monopolies. Id. An exception was made to allow the
grant of a patent to creators of new inventions for a period of fourteen years. Id. Parlia-
ment treated copyrights similarly by providing authors of original works the sole right of
publication for twenty-eight years. Id. at 974-75. The English rationale behind the grant of
both copyright and patents, as stated by the Lasercomb court, was to encourage the creative
efforts of authors and inventors. Id. at 974.
The court continued the chain of development by considering the constitutional grant of
congressional power to create patent and copyright laws. Id. at 975. The philosophy of the
framers in granting the congressional power to create both intellectual property rights was
that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance the
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'"
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 974-75.
The court concluded by noting that congressionally mandated patent and copyright laws
serve parallel public interests in that they both "seek to increase the store of human knowl-
edge and arts by rewarding inventors and authors with the exclusive rights to their works
for a limited time." Id. at 976. Consequently, due to the similar origin and supporting
policies, the Lasercomb court held that the misuse defense should apply to infringement
actions brought under either proprietary right. Id.
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provide the courts with a guide for future application of the mis-
use defense in copyright infringement actions.
I. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
From a narrow perspective, patents and copyrights inure to the
benefit of the individual owner." While it is true that patents and
copyrights are undoubtedly intended as an incentive to promote
personal achievement in the arts and sciences, their true purpose
is the broader goal of advancing the public welfare.3' Historically,
patent law has adhered to this principle of protecting the public
welfare from overextension of these exclusive proprietary rights,
as illustrated by the patent misuse defense.8 '
A. The Patent Misuse Defense
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court firmly established
the patent misuse defense to patent infringement actions in the
landmark case of Morton Salt, Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co." In Morton
Salt, both respondent and petitioner manufactured and sold salt
depositing machines and salt tablets used in the canning indus-
try." Respondent's salt depositing machines were patented.so As a
condition to the licensing agreement for their use, respondent re-
o See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1972) (discussing benefit to authors
and public objectives); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (patent and copyright laws
are "'intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers....
without burdensome requirements... ') (quoting Washington, Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S.
30, 36 (1938)); West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1582 (D.
Minn. 1985) (intent to motivate individual is means to achieve public purpose), affd, 799
F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), trt denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, 74 F. Supp. 973, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (intent to give artist "advantages of mo-
nopoly with a free choice of methods of exploitation ... [and] encourage other artists to
produce . . .because of the financial gain promised by such monopoly"). See generally
HoLMEs, supra note 2, § 1.01, at 1-2 (discussing constitutional objective of intellectual
property rights (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974))).
" See supra note 2 (policy behind patent and copyright law is to advance public welfare).
8 Morton Salt, Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942) (equity may re-
quire withholding aid where plaintiff uses right contrary to public policy); Kolene Corp. v.
Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84 (6th Cir.) (patent misuse defense based
upon public policy considerations), cert. denited, 404 U.S. 886 (1971); Comment, supra note
6, at 353 (patent law places greater weight on public right to derive benefits from technol-
ogy than on records given to inventors). See generally HoLmzs, supra note 2, § 1.07, at 1-19.
" 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
" Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490.
" Id.
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quired all licensees to purchase the salt tablets used in the leased
machines exclusively from respondent."s Respondent charged
that petitioner manufactured and leased unpatented machines
which infringed on their patent. 7 The Court invoked the patent
misuse defense, and found that respondent overextended its pat-
ent in the salt depositing machine by restraining trade in the salt
tablet market through their conditional licensing agreement."
The Court, finding the competition between respondent and peti-
tioner in the salt tablet market inconsequential, stated that it is
not a requirement, in asserting the misuse detense, that the peti-
tioner be directly affected by respondent's alleged misuse.8' The
Court held the patent misuse defense to be available to alleged
infringers when the patent owner uses patent rights to restrain
competition in the licensing or sale of unpatented products, in
contravention of the public policy underlying patent law.'" Defin-
ing "derogation of public policy," the Court averred that it is not
necessary that the misuse amount to a violation of antitrust law."'
In 1988, Congress codified, with limitations, the holding in Mor-
ton Salt" in the Patent Misuse Reform Act ("the Act").'" The Act
" d. at 491. "It thus appears that respondent is making use of its patent monopoly to
restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles, salt tablets, for use with the
patented machines, and is aiding in the creation of a limited monopoly in the tablets, not
within that granted by the patent." Id. at 491.
" Id.
" Id. at 492-94. The Court held, in applying the misuse defense, that "a patent affords
no immunity for a monopoly not within the grant." Id. at 491. A court of equity "may
appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to
the public interest." Id. at 492.
- Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492-93. The Court reasoned:
[w]here the patent is used as a means of restraining competition with the patentee's
sale of an unpatented product, the successful prosecution of an infringement suit
even against one who is not a competitor in such a sale is a powerful aid to the
maintenance of the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article, and is thus a
contributing factor in thwarting the public policy underlying the grant of the patent.
Id. at 493.
" d. at 494.
I Id. at 490, 494.
I' Id. at 494. Morton Salt held that "[tlhe patentee, like ... other holders of an exclusive
privilege granted in furtherance of a public policy, may not claim protection of his grant by
the courts where it is being used to subvert that policy." Id. See supra notes 30-37 and
accompanying text (discussion of Morton Salt).
35 U.S.C. § 271(dX5) (1988). 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) provides in relevant part:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory in-
fringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the fol-
190
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds
limited the use of the defense to cases where the alleged misuse
occurred when the patent owner conditioned the licensing of the
patented product on the acquisition of rights to, or the purchase
of, a separate product." For a finding of misuse to be justified
under these circumstances, the Act requires that the infringer
prove the patent owner has "market power in the relevant market
for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
conditioned. "46
B. The First Word on Copyright Misuse
In 1948, only six years after Morton Salt, in M. Witmark & Sons
v. Jensen,"4 the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota found the overextension of copyright monopoly power
in violation of antitrust laws sufficient to deprive a copyright
owner of the right to relief in an infringement action. 7 The
lowing: ... (4) refus[ing] to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) condition-
ing the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
Id. (emphasis added). See infra note 66 and accompanying text (legislative history of Patent
Misuse Reform Act). See also Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (patent misuse statute codified,
with limitations, holding in Morton Salt).
"4 See supra note 43 (quoting 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)
(1988)).
' 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988). See supra note 43 and accompanying text (Patent Misuse
Reform Act); Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (Patent Misuse Reform Act "limited but did not
eliminate the [Morton Salt] defense."). See also Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988
Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Coun-
terclaims, 38 DRAKE L. Rxv. 175, 196-97 (reform act did not take "sweeping and inflexible
view").
4 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948). In Witmark, plaintiffs contended that defendants,
who operated motion picture theaters, gave public performances of plaintiffs' copyrighted
musical compositions, for profit, when showing certain films. Id. at 844. Plaintiffs alleged
that defendants infringed on their copyright by performing these compositions without
first obtaining a license from plaintiffs permitting them to do so and sought damages and
an injunction preventing future violations. Id.
" Id. at 850. The court reasoned:
[olne who unlawfully exceeds his copyright monopoly and violates anti-trust [sic]
laws is not outside the pale of the law, but where the Court's aid is requested, as
noted herein, [referring to equitable relief) and the granting thereof would tend to
serve the plaintiffs in their plan and scheme . . . to extend their copyrights in a
monopolistic control beyond their proper scope, it should be denied.
Id.
It is noteworthy that reference was made to the Morton Salt patent infringement case of
as authority for the propriety of denying relief where the plaintiff used its copyright in a
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court, in dicta, stated without analysis, that "[i]n view of ... [its]
finding that the copyright monopoly has been extended, it is not
necessary to determine whether anti-trust [sic] violations alone
would deprive plaintiffs of the right of recovery."' 8 Although the
Witmark court was the first to apply the misuse defense in a copy-
right context," the applicability of the misuse defense to copy-
right infringement claims, in the absence of an antitrust violation,
was left undecided until Lasercomb.10 It is submitted that the
Lasercomb court has appropriately resolved the issue by analogiz-
ing the copyright and patent policies to justify the extension of
the misuse doctrine to copyright law. Nonetheless, absent a clear
standard for determining what conduct constitutes misuse, the
doctrine's vagueness vitiates its use."1
II. THE VAGUE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Copyrights and patents provide their owners with a limited mo-
nopoly allowing them to temporarily reap the exclusive benefits of
their original works." "Misuse" occurs when the owner extends
this monopoly in a manner violative of antitrust laws'8 or other-
manner contrary to public policy. See id.
"a Id. at 850. It is submitted that this language implies the validity of a policy-based
misuse defense to conduct that does not amount to an antitrust violation. Cf. Morton Salt,
314 U.S. at 494 (showing of antitrust violation unnecessary to successfully assert patent
misuse defense).
" See Comment, supra note 6, at 355 (Witmark is one of first cases to consider availability
of copyright misuse defense); Comment, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc.: The Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 15 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 683, 688 (1980) (Witmark one
of few precedents endorsing copyright misuse defense); GoLDnSN, COPYRIGHT: PRCIPLS.
LAW & PRACTIC § 9.6.1 at 179 (1989) ("The reported decisions indicate that only one
defendant has succeeded in interposing a misuse defense in those circumstances." (citing
M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948))).
0 See supra note 5 (illustrating indecisiveness of lower federal courts).
61 See infra notes 52-63 (vague standard of review). See also Brinson, supra note 4, at 386-
89 (need for change in law of misuse); Wallace, supra note 2, at 819-20 (possible ap-
proaches to reform of misuse doctrine).
" See supra note 3 (copyright and patent defined).
" See Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944)
(denial of relief to patentee follows from antitrust violation); In re Yarn Producing Patent
Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1976) (patentee loses power to enforce
patent if it is used in violation of antitrust laws), cert. denied sub nor. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc. v.
Universal Textural Yarns, Inc., 433 U.S. 910 (1977); I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,
201 F. Supp 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (violation of antitrust laws is defense in infringe-
ment action); Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 165 F. Supp 565, 576 (S.D. Ind. 1958)
(antitrust violation bars recovery in patent infringement action), affd in part, rev'd on other
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wise contrary to public policy." While this definition of "misuse"
is widely accepted, 5 its method of application is uncertain." Al-
though misuse which rises to the level of an antitrust violation can
grounds, 270 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960). See also American
Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 176, 186 (D. Minn. 1965)
(found no misuse; antitrust violation not sufficiently proven), affd in part, rev'd on other
grounds, 360 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966). See generally HoLMEs,
supra note 2, § 1.07, at 1-19 (courts may enjoin infringement action when patent misused
in violation of antitrust laws); Wallace, supra note 2, at 318 (misuse frequently involves
antitrust violation). Nonetheless, Witmark antitrust violations were not judicially recognized
as a valid defense to copyright infringement actions until Lasercomb. See Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987) (antitrust violations
do not constitute defense to copyright infringement), af'd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied in part, 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
1152, 1160-61 (N.D. II. 1981) (same); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F.
Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (rationale of patent actions brought in Mercoid and Morton
Salt does not extend to copyrights); Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enter. Inc., 162 F. Supp.
129, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (evidence of antitrust violation irrelevant in copyright action),
afd sub norm. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959).
" See Morton Salt, Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (courts can
withhold aid when plaintiff uses patent right contrary to public policy); Compton v. Metal
Prods., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 42 (4th Cir. 1971) (use of patent in manner contrary to public
policy is misuse); Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-Log, Inc., 396 F.2d 15, 16 (10th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968); Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 216 F.
Supp. 824, 829 (W.D.S.C. 1963) (same), a'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 164
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964). See also Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Yuma Mfg.
Co., 296 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D. Col. 1969) (adverse effect on public interest is primary
concern in misuse doctrine). But see USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505,
510 (7th Cir. 1982) (concept of preventing patent owner from using patent in manner
contrary to public policy is "too vague a formulation to be useful"), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1107 (1983). See generally GowsmuN. CoPRiGrr: ParNCIpLS., LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.6.2
(1988) (discussing misconduct other than anticompetitive behavior warranting application
of misuse doctrine); 3 P. RosENBERG. PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §16.0512], at 16-75 (2d
ed. 1990) (courts will not protect patent that is used contrary to public policy); Note, Trade
Regulation - Attempted Partial Monopoly of Unpatented Product as Defense to Suit for Direct
Infringement, 42 COLuM. L. RLv. 882, 885 (1942) (patent statute will not protect patent used
in way contrary to public policy).
See supra notes 53-54 (cases representing judicial recognition of misuse definition).
See Brinson, supra note 4, at 373-75 (discussing controversy in application of misuse
doctrine). Some courts will find misuse only where there is an antitrust violation. See, e.g.,
Saturday Evening Post Co. v Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987)
(copyright is not misused unless use results in violation of antitrust law); USM Corp., 694
F.2d at 512 (misuse defense must be evaluated under antitrust principles). Other courts do
not require the antitrust violation to be proven in order to find copyright or patent owners
guilty of misuse. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140
(1969) (misuse can be found without rising to level of antitrust violation); Transparent-
Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947) (misuse does not de-
pend on showing antitrust violation); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (summary judgment granted on patent misuse defense even though evidence
only established one element of antitrust violation); Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson
Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir.) ("misuse fneed not] be of such gravity as to violate
Clayton Act"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 830 (1964).
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be evaluated by applying the facts to statutorily defined antitrust
principles,57 the difficulty arises when the misuse is less severe. In
these situations, courts must determine whether a copyright, or
patent has been used in a manner "contrary to public policy.""
Critics of the misuse doctrine emphatically argue that the "contra-
vention of public policy" ground is "too vague a formulation to be
useful." 8 Nevertheless, courts have failed to set forth an adequate
or reasonable standard of review." In recognition of this prob-
lem, some courts have found misuse only where there is an anti-
trust vioiation, refusing to consider the pooriy defined "'contra-
vention of public policy" ground." Allowing this vague standard
See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1973); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1973). The
basic purpose of these Acts is to prohibit monopolistic behavior and conduct which consti-
tute restraint of trade. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359
(1933) (purpose of antitrust act is to prevent restraints on commerce and protect against
monopolistic endeavors); D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 173-
74 (1915) (antitrust laws prevent "conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, the mo-
nopolization of trade or commerce or attempts to monopolize the same"); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 114 (1911) (purpose of Sherman Act was to prevent
monopolistic behavior); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 12 (1911) ("Sher-
man Act is intended to prevent monopolizing or attempts to monopolize."); Ruddy Brook
Clothes, Inc. v. British Foreign & Marine Ins. Co., 103 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. I1. 1951)
(purpose of antitrust laws to prevent restrictions on trade and protect public from monopo-
listic efforts) (citing Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 359)), a ffd, 195 F.2d 86 (N.D. I1l.), cerrL
denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952). See generally Note, Vertical Patent Misuse, 61 S. CAL L. Rv.
216, 217-19 (1987) (discussion of relationship between patent misuse and antitrust laws).
n See USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 510 (finding of misuse when patent is used in manner
contrary to public policy is "too vague a formulation to be useful"); Saturday Evening Post
Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (follows USM Corp.);
Rikers Laboratories, Inc. v. Gist-Brocades N.V., 208 U.S.P.Q. 777, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(parameters of patent misuse are indistinct). But see, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80
F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn. 1948) (public policy violation sufficient to implicate misuse
defense). See generally Brinson, supra note 4, at 369-75 (criticizing misuse doctrine).
" USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 510. See 134 CONG. Rac. S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("courts impose the misuse doctrine using vague and shifting
public policy grounds").
" See 4 D. Cmsi-M, PATENs § 19.04, at 19-91 (1989) (no clear and general theory for
determining misuse). See also 134 CONG. REc S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (state-
ment of Sen. Leahy). In discussing the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Senator Leahy
emphasized the fact that no clear theory exists for determining whether behavior is misuse.
Id.
41 See supra note 6 (cases finding misuse only where there is antitrust violation). The
legislature has clearly expressed a desire to limit the availability of the misuse defense
solely to instances where improper behavior constitutes a violation of antitrust laws. See
134 CONG. Rac. H 10646-02 (daily ed. Oct 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (advo-
cating requirement that courts find patent holder guilty of misuse in limited circumstance
where conduct constitutes violation of antitrust laws); Brinson, supra note 4, at 388 (citing
American Bar Association Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Committee's report con-
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of review to perpetuate has led to a lack of uniformity in federal
court decisions,6 2 as well as a deprivation of copyright and patent
interests in cases where trivial misuse was found to be "contrary
to public policy" and sufficient to deprive an owner of the right to
bring an infringement action. 8
It is therefore submitted that the Lasercomb court fell short in
its analysis by failing to provide a useful guide for defining the
degree of conduct, contrary to public policy, that constitutes
misuse.
III. SUGGESTED STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is submitted that the vague "contrary to public policy" stan-
dard is incapable of yielding equitable results absent definitive
guidelines for its application. Reflective of similar dissatisfaction
with this vague standard pronounced originally in Morton Salt, the
legislature enacted the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act to narrow
the doctrine as it was applied in that case." Since the copyright
taining 1984 legislative proposal to deny relief for infringement only where copyright
owner violated antitrust laws).
as Compare Lasereomb, 911 F.2d at 979 (found no-contest clause to constitute misuse ab-
sent evidence of antitrust violation) with Rumbleseat Press, 816 F.2d at 1200 (found no-con-
test clause valid because no evidence of antitrust violation presented). See generally 134
CONG. Rim S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("courts have
been inconsistent in their application of the misuse doctrine to analogous practices"); D.
Cmsum, PATENTS § 19.04, at 19-91 (1989) ("[d]ecisions considering analogous practices are
not always consistent").
" See 134 CONG. Rm S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
"[Clourts have relied on the policy of antitrust laws to find patent misuse . . . without
regard to competitive implications." Id. See, e.g., Compton v. Metal Prods., Inc., 453 F.2d
38, 42 (4th Cir. 1971) (no-compete clause extended beyond patent legal time limit is per se
misuse); Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir.) (illegal
licensing clause is per se misuse), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 830 (1964); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 697 (D.S.C. 1977) (patent tie-in was per se misuse absent
business necessity for patentee on equivalent alterations for customer), af'd in part, rev'd on
other grounds, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). But see
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 202 (1980) (existence of tie-in
insufficient to activate patent misuse defense).
" See supra notes 43-45 (Patent Misuse Reform Act). The bill (S.438) originally proposed
was more restrictive, suggesting that the subsection read as follows:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his or her licensing practices or action or
inactions relating to his or her patent, unless such practices or actions or inactions,
in view of the circumstances in which such practices or actions or inactions are em-
ployed, violate the antitrust laws.
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misuse defense follows a priori from its patent law counterpart," it
is further submitted that the patent law restriction, codified in the
Act, requiring "market power in the relevant market" is a suitable
precondition to raising the defense in copyright infringement ac-
tions. Although the Act did not explicitly define these terms, leg-
islative history reveals an intent to apply antitrust concepts of
"market power" and "the relevant market."" In this respect "rel-
evant market" is defined as the area of trade or part of commerce
in which the parties involved operate, usually consisting of prod-
uct.67 "Market power" typically refers to the power to "control
prices or exclude competition."" In an effort to avoid the use of
MACPHERSON, RECENT PATENT MISUSE LEGISLATION, 270 PLI/Pat 285 (1989) (Practicing
Law Institute).
" Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 850
(D. Minn. 1948).
"See 134 CONG. Rac. H10646-02 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier). "We do expect, however, that the courts will be guided though not bound by..
. decisions of the Supreme Court in the context of antitrust analysis ...." Id. -[T]he scope
of the [relevant] market should resemble the typical antitrust analysis . I... d. See also 134
CONG. Rc S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy). "We... expect
any 'market power' determination made for patent misuse purposes to be the same as that
used with respect to an antitrust matter relating to the same factual circumstances." Id. See
generally HoLMEs, supra note 2, § 1.07, at 1-23 (discussing Congress' intent to apply anti-
trust principles when evaluating "market power in the relevant market").
o See Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Goods are in the relevant product market if they are reasonabl[y] interchangeab(le] for
the same purposes for which they are produced ....") (quoting United States v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956)); T.V. Signal Co. of Aberdeen v. Amer-
ican Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F.2d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir. 1972) (relevant market is area of
"effective competition" within which parties operate); American Football League v. Na-
tional Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1963) (relevant market is area of com-
merce which defendant "sought to appropriate to itself"); Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A.,
Inc., 673 F. Supp. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("relevant product market includes all prod-
ucts that are reasonably interchangeable"); Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 625, 637 (D. Kan. 1965) (limits of relevant market "are fixed by the area which the
defendants allegedly sought to appropriate to themselves"). See generally Ho.MEs, sun'a
note 2, § 6.02[ 1], at 6-4 to 6-9 (defining relevant market).
" United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Se
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (market power is power to con-
trol prices and exclude competition); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 811 (1946) (same); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 879 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(same), affd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
A number of evidentiary methods can be used to establish that the defendant has
[market] power. Proof that the defendant accounts for a high percentage of the total
firm sales within the market.. . can be particularly compelling evidence ... as can
be evidence that the defendant has actually exercised price leadership control over
the industry or has taken affirmative actions that have excluded actual or potential
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inflexible rules, the framers of the Act chose not to define for the
courts the level of market power required." Instead, they sug-
gested that the courts evaluate market power in the context of the
facts presented, retaining a sensitivity to the "realities of the mar-
ket place."7
The purpose of instituting the threshold requirement of "mar-
ket power in the relevant market" is to "permit the courts to rea-
sonably assess the potential for anticompetitive effect of a particu-
lar practice."71 It is submitted that misuse by a copyright owner
lacking market power will result in a de minimis effect on the rele-
vant market and, therefore, should not warrant consideration of
the misuse defense. Pragmatically, this threshold requirement lim-
its the assertion of the defense in cases of trivial misuse, 7' while
having the incidental effect of promoting judicial economy.7 '
The statutory guide provided by the Act is helpful, but not cur-
ative. 74 Once the initial requirement is met to the court's satisfac-
tion, a balancing test should be applied to determine whether the
conduct constitutes misuse. 75 This test should weigh the interests
competitors. Other useful indicators ... include the size and competitive strengths
of the defendant vis a vis its competitors ....
HoLMEs, supra note 2, § 6.02[2], at 6-9 to 6-11.
0 134 CONG. Rmr. H10646-02 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
Representative Kastenmeier explained: "We have chosen not to adopt a specific modifier
for 'market power' such as 'substantial'.... The absence of a modifier is designed to avoid
the use of inflexible rules." Id. "Inflexible .. .rules work to the benefit of infringers and
unnecessarily raise litigation costs and risks to patent owners." 134 CONG. Rxc SI 7146-02
(daily ed. Oct. 21 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
' 134 CONG. Rm H10646-02 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
, Id. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986)
(purpose of evaluating market power in relevant market is to "determine whether an ar-
rangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition").
"See supra note 60 (discussion of trivial misuse).
See 134 CONG. Rxc S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (per
se misuse rules which result in finding of trivial misuse "unnecessarily raise litigation
costs").
" See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988). It is submitted that because the Patent Misuse Re-
form Act only defines the standard of review for a situation where the licensing of a pat-
ented item is conditioned on the sale or acquisition of another unpatented item, its useful-
ness is limited.
TO See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951). The court
in Catalda, after finding that the defendant had infringed, proceeded to consider the pol-
icy-based "unclean hands" defense by utilizing a balancing test weighing two conflicting
policies: "(a) that of preventing piracy of copyrighted matter and (b) that of enforcing the
anti-trust laws." Id. The factors taken into account were: "the comparative innocence or
guilt of the parties, the moral character of their respective acts, the extent of the harm to
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of the copyright owner in the exploitation of his copyright7 e
against the public's interest in preserving competition by prevent-
ing monopolistic behavior.7 Factors to be considered are the de-
gree of the overextension of monopoly power by the copyright
owner, 78 the likelihood and severity of a negative effect on the
market resulting from the anticompetitive conduct, 7  and the se-
verity of the infringement.8 0 It is submitted that this standard will
formalize an analysis so as to avoid indiscriminate application of
the law, and insure equitable results in copyright infringement
cases where the misuse defense is asserted.
CONCLUSION
After viewing the copyright misuse defense from a historical
perspective, having considered the like treatment afforded copy-
right and patent law by the Constitution and having compared the
analogous patent misuse legislation, it is both logical and rational
to affirm the validity of its use. While the court in Lasercomb was
justifiably resolute as to the existence of the copyright misuse de-
fense, it failed to set forth a standard for its application. This
Comment has proposed a standard of review that incorporates
and expands the legislative restrictions placed on the patent mis-
the public interest, [and] the penalty inflicted on the plaintiff if we deny it relief." Id. See
also Hodash v. Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in determining
existence of patent misuse defense court must consider actions of both plaintiff and defend-
ant), crt. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press,
Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (advocating use of balancing test weighing pros
and cons of no contest clause on case by case basis when evaluating misuse); 134 CoNG.Rxc.
S17146-02 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("a balancing test of circum-
stances .. . must be employed" when evaluating misuse). See generally Oddi, Constribuoy
Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. Prrr. L. REy. 73 (1982)(doctrine of patent misuse can be equitably balanced).
14 Austin v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 776, 779 (N.D. Iii. 1962) (copyright provides "exclu-
sive right to publish, copy and vend . . . compositions"). See also supra notes 2, 3 and ac-
companying text (statutory rights granted to copyright owner).
" See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) (purpose of
Antitrust Act to prevent restraint on commerce and protect against monopolistic endeav-
ors). See also supra note 57 (cases stating purpose of antitrust laws to preserve competition).
14 See Catalda, 191 F.2d at 106. This factor was derived from the Catalda court's balanc-
ing of the "innocence or guilt of the parties." Id.
" Id. This factor was derived from the Catalda court's evaluation of "the extent of the
harm to the public interest." Id.
" Id. This factor was also derived from the Catalda court's balancing of the "innocence
or guilt of the parties." Id.
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use defense into a balancing test that remains cognizant of under-
lying public policy considerations. It is suggested that such formal-
istic guidelines will aid the courts in applying the copyright misuse
defense so as to achieve its intended purpose: to encourage the
preservation of competition by those with sanctioned monopolistic
power.
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